stag hunt example international relations

[24] Defined by Bostrom as an intellect that is much smarter than the best human brains in practically every field, including scientific creativity, general wisdom and social skills, Nick Bostrom, How long before suerintelligence? Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 5, 1(2006): 11-30. These strategies are not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but hopefully show how the outlined theory might provide practical use and motivate further research and analysis. If, by contrast, each hunter patiently keeps his or her post, everyone will be rewarded with a lavish feast. Despite the large number of variables addressed in this paper, this is at its core a simple theory with the aims of motivating additional analysis and research to branch off. a In the context of the AI Coordination Problem, a Stag Hunt is the most desirable outcome as mutual cooperation results in the lowest risk of racing dynamics and associated risk of developing a harmful AI. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. [50] This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. The area of international relations theory that is most characterized by overt metaphorical imagery is that of game theory.Although the imagery of game theory would suggest that the games were outgrowths of metaphorical thinking, the origins of game theory actually are to be found in the area of mathematics. 16 (2019): 1. Payoff variables for simulated Deadlock, Table 10. The matrix above provides one example. Actor As preference order: DC > DD > CC > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > DD > CC > DC. Despite the damage it could cause, the impulse to go it alone has never been far off, given the profound uncertainties that define the politics of any war-torn country. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. [44] Thomas C. Schelling & Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control. In order to mitigate or prevent the deleterious effects of arms races, international relations scholars have also studied the dynamics that surround arms control agreements and the conditions under which actors might coordinate with one another. Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality. As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. The primary difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken, however, is that both actors failing to cooperate is the least desired outcome of the game. The second technology revolution caused World War II. Hume's second example involves two neighbors wishing to drain a meadow. The current landscape suggests that AI development is being led by two main international actors: China and the United States. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. 15. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. 0000000016 00000 n The following subsection further examines these relationships and simulates scenarios in which each coordination model would be most likely. Additionally, both actors perceive the potential returns to developing AI to be greater than the potential harms. 0000002169 00000 n International Relations of Asia & US Foreign Policy. Payoff matrix for simulated Stag Hunt. Dipali Mukhopadhyay is an associate professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University and the author of Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 2014). > Another example is the hunting practices of orcas (known as carousel feeding). But, after nearly two decades of participation in the countrys fledgling democratic politics, economic reconstruction and security-sector development, many of these strongmen have grown invested in the Afghan states survival and the dividends that they hope will come with greater peace and stability. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a . What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? From that moment on, the tenuous bonds keeping together the larger band of weary, untrusting hunters will break and the stag will be lost. To be sustained, a regime of racial oppression requires cooperation. Furthermore, in June 2017, China unveiled a policy strategy document unveiling grand ambitions to become the world leader in AI by 2030. The response from Kabul involved a predictable combination of derision and alarm, for fear that bargaining will commence on terms beyond the current administrations control. In the event that both actors are in a Stag Hunt, all efforts should be made to pursue negotiations and persuade rivals of peaceful intent before the window of opportunity closes. No payoffs (that satisfy the above conditions including risk dominance) can generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where Stag is played with a probability higher than one half. . A classic game theoretic allegory best demonstrates the various incentives at stake for the United States and Afghan political elites at this moment. These talks involve a wide range of Afghanistans political elites, many of whom are often painted as a motley crew of corrupt warlords engaged in tribalized opportunism at the expense of a capable government and their own countrymen. 0000003638 00000 n Because of its capacity to radically affect military and intelligence systems, AI research becomes an important consideration in national security and would unlikely be ignored by political and military leaders. hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? If both choose to row they can successfully move the boat. Does a more optimistic/pessimistic perception of an actors own or opponents capabilities affect which game model they adopt? In times of stress, individual unicellular protists will aggregate to form one large body. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. Rabbits come in the form of different opportunities for short-term gain by way of graft, electoral fraud, and the threat or use of force. 'The "liberal democratic peace" thesis puts the nail into the coffin of Kenneth Waltz's claim that wars are principally caused by the anarchical nature of the international system.' THE STAG HUNT THE STAG HUNT T HE Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. In order for human security to challenge global inequalities, there has to be cooperation between a country's foreign policy and its approach to global health. Examples of the stag hunt [ edit] The original stag hunt dilemma is as follows: a group of hunters have tracked a large stag, and found it to follow a certain path. Donna Franks, an accountant for Southern Technologies Corporation, discovers that her supervisor, Elise Silverton, made several errors last year. It would be much better for each hunter, acting individually, to give up total autonomy and minimal risk, which brings only the small reward of the hare. In addition to boasting the worlds largest economies, China and the U.S. also lead the world in A.I. Discuss. What should Franks do? Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. . [55] See also Bostrom, Superintelligence at Chapter 14. Despite this, there still might be cases where the expected benefits of pursuing AI development alone outweigh (in the perception of the actor) the potential harms that might arise. However, the interest of the state has continued to overshadow the interest of the people. The first technology revolution caused World War I. Two hunters can either jointly hunt a stag (an adult deer and rather large meal) or individually hunt a rabbit (tasty, but substantially less filling). Julian E. Barnes and Josh Chin, The New Arms Race in AI, Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-arms-race-in-ai-1520009261; Cecilia Kang and Alan Rappeport, The New U.S.-China Rivalry: A Technology Race, March 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/us-china-trade-technology-deals.html. Therefore, an agreement to play (c,c) conveys no information about what the players will do, and cannot be considered self-enforcing." Photo Credit: NATO photo by Capt. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change.[1]. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People are Socially Late. A great example of chicken in IR is the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition to the pure strategy Nash equilibria there is one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Table 3. PRICE CODE 17. The real peril of a hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, though, can best be understood in political, not military, terms. Your application of the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game to international trade agreements raises a few very interesting and important questions for the application of game theory to real-life strategic situations. ? [5] They can, for example, work together to improve good corporate governance. The paper proceeds as follows. Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues. 0000006229 00000 n These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. 0000001656 00000 n For example, in a scenario where the United States and Russia are competing to be the one to land on the moon first, the stag hunt would allow the two countries to work together to achieve this goal when they would have gone their separate ways and done the lunar landing on their own. While they lie in wait, uncertain of their prospects, rabbits hop by, tempting members of the band to defect in favor of smaller but surer prey. (5OP,&|#5Y9/yU'4x r+g\t97ASNgQ+Oh iCcKzCx7<=nZefYt|.OPX:'.&|=_Ml_I{]+Mr`h+9UeovX.C; =a #/ q_/=02Q0U>#|Lod. 9i Leanna Litsch, Kabul Security Force Public Affairs. 695 0 obj It truly takes a village, to whom this paper is dedicated. In this book, you will make an introduction to realism, liberalism and economic structuralism as major traditions in the field, their historical evolution and some theories they have given birth . Each model is differentiated primarily by the payoffs to cooperating or defecting for each international actor. In order to assess the likelihood of such a Coordination Regimes success, one would have to take into account the two actors expected payoffs from cooperating or defecting from the regime. hRj0pq%[a00a IIR~>jzNTDLC=Qm=,e-[Vi?kCE"X~5eyE]/2z))!6fqfx6sHD8&: s>)Mg 5>6v9\s7U In this game "each player always prefers the other to play c, no matter what he himself plays. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. Uncategorized, Mail (will not be published) Deadlock is a common if little studied occurrence in international relations, although knowledge about how deadlocks are solved can be of practical and theoretical importance. 0000004572 00000 n Both actors see the potential harms from developing AI to be significant greater than the potential benefits, but expect that cooperating to develop AI could still result in a positive benefit for both parties. The closestapproximationof this in International Relations are universal treaties, like the KyotoProtocolenvironmental treaty. HtV]o6*l_\Ek=2m"H)$]feV%I,/i~==_&UA0K=~=,M%p5H|UJto%}=#%}U[-=nh}y)bhQ:*&#HzF1"T!G i/I|P&(Jt92B5*rhA"4 [58] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 143-144. Although the development of AI at present has not yet led to a clear and convincing military arms race (although this has been suggested to be the case[43]), the elements of the arms race literature described above suggest that AIs broad and wide-encompassing capacity can lead actors to see AI development as a threatening technological shock worth responding to with reinforcements or augmentations in ones own security perhaps through bolstering ones own AI development program. In this section, I briefly argue that state governments are likely to eventually control the development of AI (either through direct development or intense monitoring and regulation of state-friendly companies)[29], and that the current landscape suggests two states in particular China and the United States are most likely to reach development of an advanced AI system first. Every country operates selfishly in the international order. The Stag Hunt The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. to Be Made in China by 2030, The New York Times, July 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, [33] Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence., [34] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier.. hTIOSQ>M2P22PQFAH While each actors greatest preference is to defect while their opponent cooperates, the prospect of both actors defecting is less desirable then both actors cooperating. <> [16] Google DeepMind, DeepMind and Blizzard open StarCraft II as an AI research environment, https://deepmind.com/blog/deepmind-and-blizzard-open-starcraft-ii-ai-research-environment/. Additionally, the defector can expect to receive the additional expected benefit of defecting and covertly pursuing AI development outside of the Coordination Regime. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. 2 Examples of states include the United States, Germany, China, India, Bolivia, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. If one side cooperates with and one side defects from the AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows (here we assume Actor A defects while Actor B cooperates): For the defector (here, Actor A), the benefit from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that they believe such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI times Actor As perceived benefit of receiving AI with distributional considerations [P_(b|A) (AB)b_Ad_A]. [5] As a result, it is becoming increasingly vital to understand and develop strategies to manage the human process of developing AI. Table 7. Additional readings provide insight on arms characteristics that impact race dynamics. [40] Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30, 2 (1978): 167-214. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. (Pergamon Press: 1985). In recent years, artificial intelligence has grown notably in its technical capacity and in its prominence in our society. In the Prisoner's dilemma, defect is a dominant strategy and only the bad outcome is possible. (required), 2023 Cornell University Powered by Edublogs Campus and running on blogs.cornell.edu, The Stag Hunt Theory and the Formation Social of Contracts, http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. This same dynamic could hold true in the development of an AI Coordination Regime, where actors can decide whether to abide by the Coordination Regime or find a way to cheat. In biology many circumstances that have been described as prisoner's dilemma might also be interpreted as a stag hunt, depending on how fitness is calculated. What are the two exceptions to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter? SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified . Similar strategic analyses can be done on variables and variable relationships outlined in this model. Why do trade agreements even exist? Table 13. This may not amount to a recipe for good governance, but it has meant the preservation of a credible bulwark against state collapse. 0000004367 00000 n [45] Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, (Cornell Univ. [53] A full list of the variables outlined in this theory can be found in Appendix A. Each player must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. So it seems that the moral of the story is that we are selfish human beings with little patience or trust in others, even if that cooperation meant mutual benefit. Language links are at the top of the page across from the title. In this paper, I develop a simple theory to explain whether two international actors are likely to cooperate or compete in developing AI and analyze what variables factor into this assessment. I thank my advisor, Professor Allan Dafoe, for his time, support, and introduction to this papers subject matter in his Global Politics of AI seminar. This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. In the stag hunt, two hunters must each decide whether to hunt the stag together or hunt rabbits alone. War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. If a hunter leaps out and kills the hare, he will eat, but the trap laid for the stag will be wasted and the other hunters will starve. 0000002252 00000 n If they both work to drain it they will be successful, but if either fails to do his part the meadow will not be drained. Like the hunters in the woods, Afghanistans political elites have a great deal, at least theoretically, to gain from sticking together. [14] IBM, Deep Blue, Icons of Progress, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/. If both choose to leave the hedge it will grow tall and bushy but neither will be wasting money on the services of a gardener. Actor As preference order: CC > DC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CC > CD > DD > DC. Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an As will hold for the following tables, the most preferred outcome is indicated with a 4, and the least preferred outcome is indicated with a 1., Actor As preference order: DC > CC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DD > DC. Together, these elements in the arms control literature suggest that there may be potential for states as untrusting, rational actors existing in a state of international anarchy to coordinate on AI development in order to reduce future potential global harms. Several animal behaviors have been described as stag hunts. Landing The Job You Want Through YourNetwork, Earth Day: Using game theory and AI to beat thepoachers, Adopting to Facebooks new Like Alternative. Solving this problem requires more understanding of its dynamics and strategic implications before hacking at it with policy solutions. As described in the previous section, this arms race dynamic is particularly worrisome due to the existential risks that arise from AIs development and call for appropriate measures to mitigate it. This allows for coordination, and enables players to move from the strategy with the lowest combined payoff (both cheat) to the strategy with the highest combined payoff (both cooperate). Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. 0000006962 00000 n As an advocate of structural realism, Gray[45] questions the role of arms control, as he views the balance of power as a self-sufficient and self-perpetuating system of international security that is more preferable. Finally, in the game of chicken, two sides race to collision in the hopes that the other swerves from the path first. Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. See Katja Grace, John Salvatier, Allan Dafoe, Baobao Zhang, & Owain Evans, When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. What is the 'New Barbarism' view of contemporary conflicts? [54] In a bilateral AI development scenario, the distribution variable can be described as an actors likelihood of winning * percent of benefits gained by winner (this would be reflected in the terms of the Coordination Regime). Meanwhile, both actors can still expect to receive the anticipated harm that arises from a Coordination Regime [P_(h|A or B) (AB)h_(A or B)]. What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? (lljhrpc). A relevant strategy to this insight would be to focus strategic resources on shifting public or elite opinion to recognize the catastrophic risks of AI. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. Those who play it safe will choose Meanwhile, the harm that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the actors perceived likelihood that such a regime would create a harmful AI expressed as P_(h|A) (AB)for Actor A and P_(h|B) (AB)for Actor B times each actors perceived harm expressed as hA and hB. Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo.. [22] Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, ProPublica, May 23, 2016 https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. This subsection looks at the four predominant models that describe the situation two international actors might find themselves in when considering cooperation in developing AI, where research and development is costly and its outcome is uncertain.

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